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Abstract 
Much current research on collective victimhood acknowledges the role of rhetoric but 
does not fully address the implications for micro-level variation in personal expressions of 
victimhood. The focus has tended to be on individual differences in collective victimhood 
construals where people may either see their group as the sole possessor of victim-status or may 
incorporate other groups into an inclusive category. While recent research sees a strategic 
element in some “inclusivity”, we argue that all claims of victimhood are strategic. By using a 
discursive approach, we show variability in the expression of victimhood and how this 
accomplishes different activities in conversations. Several focus groups consisting of victims 
from Northern Ireland were analysed to identify presentations of victimhood and their relation to 
the unfolding dynamics of the conversation. We demonstrate that presentation of victimhood is 
an interactional concern, link this to the concept of “needs” and suggest implications this might 
have. 
 
Keywords: victimhood, intergroup relations, collective victimhood, rhetorical 
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Competing or sharing? The rhetorical complexity of competitive and common victimhood 
Much current research into collective victimhood, while acknowledging the role of 
rhetoric, methodologically places it on the sidelines. Such research tends to focus on the 
cognitive aspects of victimhood rather than exploring the ways in which it is articulated and the 
functions thereof. In consequence, while inter-personal variability of victimhood-beliefs is 
explored, the intra-personal and intra-group variation in how victimhood-beliefs are expressed is 
not adequately addressed. However, focussing on the rhetoric of victimhood gives insight into 
the variability and complexity of it at a micro-level of analysis. Discursive and rhetorical 
psychology has pointed out that expressing attitudes and beliefs is rarely stable and that people 
vary what they say depending on how they want to present themselves and what they want to 
accomplish (Billig, 1987; McKinlay & McVittie, 2009; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). In other 
words, discourse about beliefs is functional (oriented towards a goal) and rhetorical (the goal is 
an argumentative one). In this paper we suggest that collective victimhood is no different. While 
it is helpful to outline interpersonal differences in construals of victimhood and to examine links 
with various outcomes, discursive expressions of victimhood must be seen as rhetorical and thus 
variable within persons and groups. An unexplored question in the study of victimhood then is, 
to what rhetorical ends is collective victimhood employed and to what extent does this vary 
depending on the conversational context? In answering this question, it will be helpful to begin 
by surveying some forms of collective victimhood currently identified in the literature and in 
turn explore how these may be reconceptualised as discursive and rhetorical accomplishments. 
Competitive victimhood 
One way of categorizing victim beliefs is to show that people may be competitive in their 
understanding of their victimhood in relation to the other conflict group(s) (Noor, Brown, 
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Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & 
Nadler, 2012). Victimhood is a symbolic resource that groups compete over as they claim to be 
the only legitimate victim or that they have suffered most. It does not matter that some groups 
may be quite easily identifiable as perpetrators – even they can identify as victims (Noor, Brown, 
Gonzalez, et al., 2008). In the context of Northern Ireland, Hamber and Kelly (2005, p. 18) point 
out that victims often claim to be the “real” victims and that due to an hierarchy of victimhood, 
their needs have been neglected. Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, et al. (2008) suggest that this sense of 
being the true victim may arise out of the need to have the group’s suffering acknowledged and 
that this mindset hinders reconciliation. Studies have confirmed this negative link to prosocial 
outcomes in a variety of contexts: in Chile (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, et al., 2008), Northern 
Ireland (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008), Kosovo (Andrighetto, Mari, Volpato, & Behluli, 2012) 
and Israel/Palestine (Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013). But negative outcomes are not our focus 
here. Rather, it is important to notice that competitive victimhood is functional: it is a symbolic 
resource to get suffering acknowledged and to gain political advantages (Smyth, 1998). Noor et 
al. (2012) give several other psychological functions of competitive victimhood: increasing 
ingroup cohesiveness, justification of violence, denial of responsibility, avoidance of negative 
group emotions, requests for compensation and recruitment of moral and material support from 
third parties. For each of these psychological functions, the discursive expression can be 
understood in rhetorical terms. 
Firstly, increasing ingroup cohesiveness is a function of competitive victimhood because 
it clearly defines and unites a suffering ingroup while identifying a perpetrating outgroup 
(Ignatieff, 1993; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Leaders can use narratives about past suffering 
to bind group members together as common victims and this can extend to the unification of 
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generations through the experience of vicarious victimhood (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, 
& Schmader, 2006). As older generations tell the narratives of the past conflict to the younger 
generation, they also begin to share vicariously in the suffering of the past and this unites people. 
Yet the process by which the sense of victimhood is perpetuated is discursive and occurs in the 
discourse of leaders and older generations. These narratives must be framed in rhetorical ways 
because they are competitive and seek to argue against the other side’s narrative while justifying 
the ingroup narrative. The cohesiveness that then emerges can be understood as sharing the same 
general arguments about ingroup suffering and outgroup perpetration. This is the case in 
Northern Ireland where community leaders actively seek a coherent collective memory as a 
means of strengthening ingroup identity and providing a hermeneutic for contemporary events 
(McAuley, 2016). 
Secondly, competitive victimhood justifies violence against the outgroup. The group can 
exaggerate ingroup vulnerability (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003) and stir up emotions such as 
humiliation (Goldman, 2008; Jones, 2006; Lindner, 2001) and fear (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-
Zehngut, & Drori, 2008) which have action-tendencies (Frijda, 1987; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 
2000) towards violence. Yet justification for violence through appealing to victimisation is 
rhetorical – a point made by Vollhardt (2009, p. 138). If fear, humiliation and a sense of 
vulnerability are used to justify violence, it is in the context of arguing against a non-violent 
perspective. 
Thirdly, denial of responsibility and the avoidance of negative group emotions are ways 
in which competitive victimhood functions (Noor et al., 2012, p. 9). These are linked because the 
idea of “collective guilt” (Klein, Licata, & Pierucci, 2011; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) is often 
minimised among groups to deny responsibility for past actions (Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 
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2009). But the acceptance or denial of responsibility is rhetorical and if victimhood functions to 
deny responsibility for past actions then it will do so rhetorically. A victimised group might 
argue that because they are victims they are not responsible for their crimes since they acted in 
self-defence. 
Fourthly, requests for compensation and recruitment of moral and material support are 
ways of using victimhood to compete with another group (Manzi & González, 2007). This is 
significant in post-conflict societies where compensation may be available for past suffering. 
Groups may compete over past suffering to generate a greater sense of entitlement. While the 
conflict might have ceased in terms of physical violence, it still rages in terms of gaining 
resources. The groups may present themselves as having suffered most and thus as being 
innocent and worthy of support (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). These are arguments from 
victimhood for material benefits. 
For all the functions of competitive victimhood a clear rhetorical significance can be 
identified. The construction of competitive victimhood within discourse serves the rhetorical 
function of arguing for various entailments such as violence or material support or 
acknowledgement. While a similar point is made by Noor et al. (2012) when they say that group 
leaders can “construct a discourse that revolves around CV [competitive victimhood]” (p. 3), the 
variability of such discourses is not developed and variability is conceptualised primarily in 
terms of inter-individual variation. We argue that while there are individual differences, more 
attention could be given to rhetorical variation within discourse at the micro-level of analysis.  
Inclusive victim consciousness 
Another way of categorising victim beliefs is to point out that not all victims compete 
with other victims over status; they may see other victims as sharing victimhood. According to 
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Vollhardt (2009, 2015), inclusive victim consciousness is the sense that others have suffered 
similarly to one’s group (although it may not be the conflict outgroup). This draws on Construal 
Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) which postulates that events can be represented more 
specifically or abstractly and this will affect who is included in the experience. Thus victimhood 
can be construed narrowly (an exclusive victim consciousness which aligns somewhat with the 
concept of competitive victimhood) or more broadly (in which one sees other groups across the 
world as having suffered from similar experiences). Noor et al. (2012) propose a related concept, 
common victimhood identity, in which the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner, Dovidio, 
Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) is used to show that different groups can be recategorised 
into a higher-order ingroup with corresponding changes in inter-group relations. In the case of 
victim groups, two opposing groups may recategorise themselves into an overarching group of 
victims of the conflict despite differing roles. 
There are emotional and behavioural consequences of holding inclusive beliefs. Seeing 
other sufferers as part of a common ingroup can lead to empathy (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), 
sympathy/liking (Karylowski, 1976) and emotional solidarity (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & 
Gordijn, 2003). This can lead to prosocial actions on behalf of other victims (e.g. Catholic 
Nationalists in Northern Ireland supporting the plight of Palestinians; Vollhardt, 2009). 
Similarly, with the related concept of common victimhood identity, which is focussed on the 
conflict outgroup, there are important prosocial outcomes. Recategorising one’s own victim-
group and the outgroup victims as part of a shared identity leads to increased forgiveness and 
desire for reconciliation (González, Manzi, & Noor, 2011; Noor, Brown, Taggart, Fernandez, & 
Coen, 2010). 
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Even in the case of this more prosocial form of victimhood, we want to argue that the 
rhetorical dimension is important. After conducting research in Northern Ireland which found no 
relationship between competitive victimhood and inclusive victimhood (although they should, 
theoretically, have been inversely correlated), Cohrs, McNeill, & Vollhardt (2015) argued that 
inclusivity may be used strategically. Follow-up studies confirmed that there were both 
“selective” and “universal” forms of inclusivity. In the former, participants would align 
themselves with partisan causes (e.g. Catholics in Northern Ireland with Palestinians; Protestants 
with Israelis) whereas in the latter, the universal form of inclusivity, participants would align 
themselves with suffering groups because of their suffering, and not for partisan reasons. 
Selective inclusivity correlated with competitive victimhood whereas universal inclusivity 
correlated with desire for reconciliation. The authors argue that, “expressing shared victimization 
with other groups may be used strategically to strengthen the ingroup’s position in an intergroup 
conﬂict” (p. 634) – a point with which we concur. Victimhood, even in inclusive forms, can be 
used strategically. Yet even here, while showing individual differences in how forms of 
inclusivity can be used, we argue that more can potentially be said about temporal variability 
within individuals’ expressions of inclusivity. There is nothing to prevent selective and universal 
forms of inclusivity being used by the same person or group at different times. 
What motivates victimhood? 
Having argued that victimhood is rhetorical, strategic and functional, one is led to ask, 
“What motivates victimhood”? In one sense, the desired goals (material compensation, 
justification of violence, acknowledgement, etc.) motivate the way victimhood is expressed, but 
is there anything deeper than this? One suggestion is that expressions of victimhood are 
motivated by human needs. It is argued that victims have had needs for safety, security, positive 
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relations, esteem, and sense of control frustrated – to name only a few (ten Boom & Kuijpers, 
2012). Similarly, Joyce and Lynch (2015) have argued the importance of affirmative needs and 
the need for certainty. The idea has been empirically tested by Shnabel & Nadler (2008) who 
suggested that after conflicts, perpetrators and victims will have different needs. Because 
perpetrators will have caused harm and will look bad in the eyes of the world, they will need to 
have their positive moral image restored. On the other hand, victims do not need their image 
restored (they are accepted as being innocent) but will need to have their sense of self-efficacy 
restored. Differential needs will require different approaches to their satisfaction. Shnabel & 
Nadler (2008) found that in manipulating the messages exchanged between “perpetrators” and 
“victims” (in hypothetical scenarios), victims who gave a message of acceptance (denoting 
positive morality) to perpetrators, and perpetrators who gave a message of empowerment 
(denoting agency) to victims were both more willing to reconcile with the other. Further studies 
show that this effect occurs even when the agent who delivers the acceptance/empowerment 
message is a neutral third party but mutual trust is increased more when delivered by the other 
conflict party (Shnabel, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2014). They suggest that this is a good example of 
what reconciliation actually entails: an “exchange” of symbolic resources which fulfils the needs 
of the other. Thus intergroup reconciliation must remove emotional barriers that block successful 
resolution of the conflict (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). 
The needs-based model of reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 
2008) ties in with competitive victimhood (Noor et al., 2012). Why do people engage in 
competitive victimhood? One reason is that it satisfies an emotional need. When the victimised 
group argue that they have suffered more than the other group, other groups respond by 
expressing empathy, support and recognition of their suffering. The victimised group can also 
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appeal to the perpetrator to recognise their suffering and offer some form of compensation. Both 
of these cases grant the fulfilment of the need for power in the victimised group. The perpetrator 
group can also engage in competition over victimhood. As they argue that they have suffered 
more, they draw attention to their suffering and mitigate their guilt. This fulfils their need for 
moral acceptance (Noor et al., 2012, p. 10). 
Of course there is often ambiguity with regards to who is guilty and who is innocent; who 
is the perpetrator and who is the victim. Nevertheless, Noor et al. (2012, p.11) hold that there are 
good reasons for speaking about some degree of asymmetry. Firstly, there may be asymmetric 
power relations such that one group is structurally more powerful than another. Both groups may 
compete over victimhood so that different needs may be satisfied. Secondly, when specific 
incidents are discussed from the past there is often an asymmetry which both groups recognise. 
Some groups may feel responsible for perpetrating certain incidents and may feel victimised 
because of other incidents. This prompts both groups to engage in competitive victimhood to 
satisfy different needs that arise as a result of different incidents being made salient. 
What must be remembered is that the normal way for these events to be made salient is 
through conversation and argument: they are made discursively salient. While Noor et al. (2012, 
p. 10) address the role of discourse and arguments on the part of those who meet the needs of 
victims (e.g. through “expressions of empathy” and “justifying their aspiration[s]”), less attention 
is paid to the role of victims in making their needs salient. But victims are often active in making 
their needs known. And as this is conducted discursively, the satisfaction of a particular need can 
also be a discursive satisfaction. In other words, the “need” can be conceptualised rhetorically 
(i.e. gaining the upper hand in the argument) and its satisfaction can be conceptualised 
rhetorically (i.e. being vindicated in the argument). This fits perfectly with the discursive notion 
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of variability (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1998) which maintains that attitudes are not 
necessarily stable but vary depending on the rhetorical context. Thus the way competitive 
victimhood is argued can vary and the reason for its maintenance will vary depending on the 
context. This is seen to some extent in the work of Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood (2010) in 
Northern Ireland who suggestively note that some of their participants wanted to present 
themselves as being resilient and so did not identify individually as victims. Nevertheless, they 
identified as part of a victimised group which gave them a label of power. While the authors did 
not make the link with rhetoric (they used a phenomenological approach), we would argue that 
there is rhetorical significance to this distinction. 
Forms of victimhood as rhetorical and variable 
This then, is the point we have been driving towards: forms of victimhood can be seen as 
strategic positions; these positions are rhetorical; and as rhetorical positions, they vary depending 
on the goal that is being aimed at. Furthermore, the concept of needs is helpful insofar as it 
points out that forms of victimhood are used to satisfy rhetorical “needs” of the speaker. In 
essence, we are striving for a rhetorical conception of victimhood in order to show its strategic 
nature and potential variability in contrast to research which has focussed on inter-individual 
variability rather than at the micro-level of discourse. In this paper, we draw on interviews with 
groups of victims to show that, depending on the conversational demands, participants may vary 
their expression of victimhood, and this with clear strategic goals. We must however, make a 
clarification: By arguing for the rhetorical nature of victimhood we are not seeking to discount 
the actual experiences of victims. We are pointing out that whether or not a person (or group) 
identifies as a victim is bound up with rhetoric; the act of claiming victimhood is a rhetorical act. 
Similarly, we are not trying to discount the felt needs of those who have suffered trauma and loss 
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as mere rhetoric (see Billig, 1987, p.62 for more on the idea of “mere rhetoric”). We 
acknowledge real experiences and real suffering. But we are pointing out that talking about 
needs requires rhetorically constructing those needs, utilising them in specific circumstances and 
for specific ends. And while we argue that these ends can be rhetorical (e.g. acknowledgement of 
suffering or affirmation of agency), there is often an extra-linguistic element to these (i.e. the 
payment of compensation may be the way in which acknowledgement of suffering is enacted). In 
short, we are not trying to reduce the experience of victimhood to “mere rhetoric” but rather, 
seeking to show the role of rhetoric in claiming specific forms of victimhood, at specific times 
and for specific ends. 
Research context 
The research reported in this paper was conducted in Northern Ireland, which has a long 
history of violent conflict. The main protagonists are commonly designated as Protestants 
(usually Unionists who desire continued alliance with the United Kingdom, of which they are a 
part) and Catholics (usually Nationalists who desire alliance with the Republic of Ireland in the 
South). While these delineations can be useful, it is also worth noting that there is some degree 
of intra-group variability (Ferguson & Gordon, 2007). The more militant counterparts of both 
these groups are Loyalists and Republicans respectively. While most physical violence has 
abated with the signing of the 1998 peace agreement and subsequent power-sharing 
arrangements, segments of more militant groups have continued to use sporadic violence. 
Victimhood therefore, is rife in Northern Ireland. It is estimated that over 3 600 people were 
killed and around 40 000 injured since the Troubles commenced (Manktelow, 2007). Despite 
this, most people in Northern Ireland do not think of themselves as victims and only around 12% 
think of themselves as victims regularly (Cairns, Mallett, Lewis, & Wilson, 2003). Nevertheless, 
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the number of people who have experienced victimisation is much higher (Brewer & Hayes, 
2011) and the theme of “victimhood” is prominent in public discourse (Gilligan, 2003). Clearly 
there are complex factors that affect identification with the label of “victim” and the rhetorical 
implications of the label are part of this. Those who do identify as victims have often formed 
themselves into smaller “victim groups” for support and campaigning purposes. It was to these 
victim groups that we turned for discussion about their victimhood. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
We conducted a series of three focus groups, two interviews and one dual-interview. We 
had two Protestant-Unionist focus groups (5 members of Mourne Action for Survivors of 
Terrorism, MAST, lasting 1 hour and 15 minutes, Males=2, Females=3; and 5 members of 
Families Acting for Innocent Relatives, FAIR, lasting 1 hour and 13 minutes, M=3, F=2), one 
Catholic-Nationalist (8 members of Ballymurphy victims lasting 1 hour and 16 minutes, M=4, 
F=4), one non-aligned interview (WAVE Trauma Centre lasting 31 minutes, M=1), one 
Protestant-Unionist interview (at FAIR, lasting 37 minutes, M=1) and one Republican ex-
prisoner dual interview (with Coiste na nIarchimí, lasting 31 minutes, M=2). The latter group 
was an ex-prisoners group which may seem unusual given that we were examining victims. 
However, such people are categorised as victims legally in Northern Ireland and we did not want 
to make an a priori decision about who was and who was not a victim. In the analysis below we 
report extracts from the MAST and Ballymurphy focus groups and the dual interview with 
Coiste because they show the clearest examples of variability in the data and in the case of 
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Coiste, the clearest example of responding to a threatened sense of morality (because it is an ex-
prisoners’ group rather than a victims’ group). 
Materials 
The interviews and focus groups were conducted with the aid of an interview schedule 
that covered questions such as, “Do you feel that other people in your community are listening to 
the voices of victims?”, “Do you think that some victims or some groups of victims are receiving 
more attention than others? Or are all victims being treated equally?”, and “What should the rest 
of society be doing about victims?”. At the start of the interview, participants were told that the 
interviewer was conducting research on the subject of victimhood in Northern Ireland and 
wanted to hear the views of victims after having conducted extensive analysis of the views of 
politicians. Also at the start, some interviews and focus groups received an article from a local 
newspaper about the needs of victims to prompt some discussion but this was merely an 
icebreaker and tended not to be referred to after the initial reading. These materials and the entire 
study was approved by the Ethics Committee at the university where the research was conducted. 
Procedure 
Emails were sent to numerous victims’ groups inviting them to a focus group “to discuss 
the current state of victim issues in Northern Ireland”. After initial contact with the groups, the 
first author arranged a suitable time and place to meet the groups/individuals. This was always 
conducted on their own premises and not at an academic institution. After introducing himself, 
the researcher asked permission to record the discussion for transcription purposes and began the 
recording. Throughout the discussions, the aim was to cover the topics in a semi-structured 
fashion and to allow participants to talk freely about what they thought was important. Inasmuch 
as was possible, the interviewer presented himself as sympathetic to the group’s concerns to 
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facilitate more openness in the discussion (Merton, 1972). If the purpose of the interviews was to 
uncover naturally occurring rhetoric, it would be unsuitable for the interviewer to appear as a 
complete outsider (which could be an obvious prompt to engage in justification of the group). 
While “doing similarity” may not always work (Abell, Locke, Condor, Gibson, & Stevenson, 
2006), if it is properly received by the recipient, it may be effective in encouraging more 
openness. 
Following the interviews, data was transcribed and marked to indicate emphases 
(underlined text). 
Analytic method 
As outlined in the introduction, our perspective was one of rhetorical or discursive 
psychology which has as its focus, the functions of discourse (Billig, 1987; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Potter, 1996). This meant that we were constantly asking, “What are participants doing by 
saying something?” Another key concept was that discourse is variable and this has been 
explored by Potter & Wetherell (1987) and Billig (1987) who offer striking examples of how 
variable discourse can vary depending on what the speaker is arguing for. In one instant Maoris 
can be described as a “lazy race” by participants and in the next as “such hard-working people” 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 125). Again, a participant with “strong views” about the monarchy 
can both support and contest such a structure (Billig, 1989). More recently, variability has been 
studied in relation to issues as diverse as the expression of gender as a presentation of self 
(Wetherell & Edley, 2014), authoritarian and non-authoritarian responses to questions about 
right-wing authoritarianism (Gray & Durrheim, 2013), and clinical psychologists’ constructions 
of mental health (Lofgren, Hewitt, & das Nair, 2015). Furthermore, in political discourse in 
Northern Ireland, speakers have been found to vary their claims of being a minority or majority 
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depending on the context (Stevenson, Condor, & Abell, 2007). These studies differ with regards 
to the issues in which they explore variability but all stress that these variations are rhetorically 
motivated. In our case, to explore variability in expressions of victimhood, we paid careful 
attention to how group boundaries were being defined and in what contexts this was occurring. 
Interviewers were coded to indicate where different constructions of victimhood occurred (i.e. 
inclusive or exclusive forms) and then differences within interviews were highlighted. Our goal 
was not merely to point out that variability does occur (that is well-established) but to show why 
it occurs and what functions it serves. By demonstrating the functions we can then make some 
links between the concept of needs and the functions of victimhood-framing in conversations. 
Therefore, after identifying the forms of victimhood and variability within interviews, we 
carefully read the interviews to explore the context in which the expression of victimhood 
occurred, what conversational demands led to the framing of victimhood in that way, and what 
kind of outcome was obtained by framing victimhood thus. 
 
Analysis and findings 
Variability in a Unionist group 
If a common victim identity is bound up with notions of similarity in terms of suffering, 
then one way of exploring identity in the discussions is to look for how the participants treat 
similarity and difference. If there is variability here, then we can argue that there is variability in 
how the category of victim is being treated. In this section, we explore the discussion of the 
MAST focus group, a Unionist group from County Down. 
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In one section of the focus group, the group argues that Protestant and Catholics are 
different in their approach to victimhood. This emerges in a discussion (Extract 1) about one 
woman who calls herself a “survivor” and not a “victim”.  
Extract 1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
D: And the same people’s saying… I know a man that has been shot and 
his wife doesn’t think she’s a victim. 
B: She’ll correct ye and tell you, “I’m a survivor” 
[…] 
D: And that’s the way the people, people down here’s very private. Very 
very private. You know, and I’ll tell you about the people here too, they don’t go 
looking for things 
I: Yea 
B: They’re too proud. 
D: They’re too proud. They’ll not run lookin for benefits. We’ve a 
woman who can do all the benefits that… there’s not. I think she’s one person. 
I: Yea 
D: Over all the years comin here lookin for benefits. That’s the sort of 
people down here. They’ll not run… they think they’re takin it off the state. You 
know, and that’s why they don’t do it. 
I: Yea 
D: You know, where the other side would take the arm off ya - and know 
how to get all the benefits. You know.  
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The group attributes this denial of the label “victim” to her character as a “private” (line 
5) person who represents her community’s characteristics by not seeking benefits. Two reasons 
are attributed by the speaker for why this woman does not identify as a victim. Firstly, he takes 
the woman as representative of the population of the area and says firstly that the “people down 
here” are “very private” (line 5). Secondly, “the people here... don’t go looking for things” (lines 
6-7). This is in direct contrast to “the other side” who “would take the arm off ya” (line 17). This 
may be drawing on broader stereotypes of the other community which the speaker then uses to 
construct difference between the communities. But this emphasis on the difference between 
Protestants and Catholics with reference to their victimhood is not always maintained and 
differences and similarities are invoked for their rhetorical effect. While stereotypes might 
undergird such statements, the discursive activation of these stereotypes is not random but is 
oriented towards a particular effect. 
Towards the end the interviewer asked the group about their involvement with the wider 
community. However, the word “community” got taken up as a reference to “cross-community” 
work which initiated a discussion about the relationship between Catholics and Protestants in the 
group. There was a lengthy section where the group explain why there are no Catholics (except 
one partner of a member) in the group. One explanation was that it just so happened that the 
majority of deaths in that area had been Protestant which then explains why the group is made up 
of Protestants. The interviewer then ventured to suggest that the nature of victimhood for 
Catholics and Protestants was different because the two communities were so separated from 
each other. But this suggestion actually encountered some resistance. This seems to be because 
the comments were leading in the direction of saying that the group would not include Catholic 
victims because they were different from Protestants. Or to put it another way, the comments 
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seem to be taken as a kind of sectarianism which would reflect badly on the group given their 
efforts to explain that the reason for the lack of Catholics in their group was not sectarian. A says, 
“You know it’s not anything divisive that we’re tryin to do.” Again, E stresses, “It’s not 
sectarian.” 
Against this backdrop of arguing against sectarian tendencies in the group, the 
interviewer’s comments in Extract 2 are challenged: 
Extract 2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
I: And the nature 
C: Yea yea yea 
I: Of the deaths of the Protestant side are different from the nature of the 
deaths, even innocent deaths,  
A: Yea 
I: On the Catholic side 
A: Hmm 
C: Hm? 
I: Even innocent death o- deaths on the Catholic side very often the 
nature of them, are different 
C: I mean I eh like I I I mean yes well I dunno how to say this like 
certainly there has been Catholics been murdered, you know  
I: Yea 
C: By loyalists - I don’t agree with that either you know I don’t you 
know I mean they are just 
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A: Innocent mistaken identity and things 
C: They’re just, they’re innocent just the same as we’re you know 
A: Yep 
I: But that’s different 
C: Is it? 
 I: I’m not sayin it’s differ-, but I would feel that that would be like a 
different kind of victimhood almost? Because Northern Ireland has been so 
segregated Catholic and Protestant communities have been so different and 
obviously with the relatives in the Police force 
C: I I honestly I don’t know why ... 
While initially, C enthusiastically agrees with what the interviewer says by saying “Yea” 
repeatedly throughout line 2, she stops when it appears that he is going against the anti-sectarian 
nature of the argument. So in line 7 A gives a thoughtful/uncertain “hmm” which seems to 
indicate that she is unsure of what has been said and C gives a questioning “Hm?” (line 8). This 
indicates that the sentence has taken an unexpected turn in the overall flow of the argument and 
she seeks clarification. 
After seeking clarification, the interviewer then repeats his statement in similar language 
in lines 9-10. In response to this, C points out that there are actually Catholics who are “just the 
same as we’re you know” (line 17). To this he continues to press his point by saying, “But that’s 
different” (line 19). However, the only response is, “Is it?” This is not accusatory but more 
questioning so he tries to provide an explanation in lines 21-24 but in 25, C expresses her lack of 
understanding as to why there is segregation in Northern Ireland. She seems to be implying that 
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the segregation is meaningless to some extent. This leads her to explain how she actually has a 
Catholic friend who is also a victim. 
Extract 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
C: I have a friend who is a Roman Catholic and I mean, and a very 
very good friend like I don’t dis- I would still be, have friends and he, she is a 
friend you know really a very good friend and she’s has gone through the 
same thing as me, you know what I mean. But maybe if she hadn’t have went 
through the same thing as me we wouldn’t have the same thing in common if 
you know what I mean. 
In Extract 3, C explains that she has a Catholic friend with the same experience of 
victimhood. The fact that they have both had the same experience means that they have 
something in common. Thus, by the use of this personal experience, C nullifies the interviewer’s 
point that the Catholic experience is necessarily different. Furthermore, the use of her personal 
experience to make this claim of similarity strengthens it and makes it difficult to contest since it 
is a private experience (see Wiggins & Potter, 2003 for a discussion of the function of subjective 
claims in discourse). She then goes on to talk about what happened to her friend and her 
relationship with her friend. She reaches her main point beginning at line 1 of Extract 4: 
Extract 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
C: But we both 
A: You’ve still lost somebody close 
E: It’s not because 
C: We both still lost somebody close. It’s not a Catholic and 
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8 
Protestant thing 
E: It’s not a Catholic Protestant thing it’s the loss 
B: It’s the fact that you’ve both lost 
C: It’s the fact that we’ve both lost 
The conclusion of her argument is that her experience of victimhood could be shared with 
a Catholic (they “both still lost somebody close”, line 4) and therefore, victimhood is “not a 
Catholic and Protestant thing” (lines 4-5). The echoing of the speakers as they repeat what each 
other says indicates that they are all agreeing and lending their own voices as a form of 
solidarity. At the start of this part of the focus group the interviewer had suggested that there 
were significant differences between Catholics and Protestants. But this view was not accepted 
by the group and ran counter to their argument that the lack of Catholics in the group was not 
sectarian. Therefore, C argues that her friend serves as a good example of a Catholic who was a 
fellow-victim who had the same experience of victimhood. This dismantles the interviewer’s 
contention that there was a Protestant-Catholic divide in victimhood. 
But how does this fit with other statements in the group that were sectarian? For example, 
the group engage in discussing how the difference in uptake of benefits in the two communities 
reflected badly on “the other side”. Why does no member of the group dissent from that apparent 
sectarianism? 
We think the best answer to explain why both sectarian and non-sectarian views of 
victimhood are found co-existing is that rhetorical variability shapes the expression of 
victimhood beliefs (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 49). This variability occurs because rhetorical 
contexts change and with those changes comes the need to argue differently. In some contexts, 
the group argue in a sectarian way to show the noble nature of Protestants. In other contexts, the 
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group argue for a similarity of experience between Protestants and Catholics to show that the 
group is not sectarian. Either way, the group is rhetorically motivated to present themselves and 
their group in a good light. Sometimes that requires seemingly opposing strategies. It can be seen 
that ways of constructing victimhood – shared or not shared – are rhetorically driven. 
Variability in a Nationalist group 
Another illustration of variability in constructing victimhood comes from the 
Ballymurphy group in which there is a tension between acknowledging all victims and arguing 
that some victims merit special attention. In other words, there is a tension between 
“inclusive/common victimhood” and “competitive victimhood”. After talking at length about 
how victims are treated differently and how victims of state violence are neglected, the 
interviewer raised the question of the definition of a victim in lines 2-5 of Extract 5. This leads E 
to respond in line 8 that “Everybody’s a victim.” 
Extract 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
I: Yea. Another thing that leads to differences in the way victims is - 
victims are treated as you mentioned was, the definition of a victim, and some 
Unionist politicians have got this definition of a victim which almost excludes 
anybody that wasn’t harmed by the IRA em how do you feel about the way 
definitions of victims have been treated? 
A: We we believe that any victims, as I says earlier on, any victims 
E: Everybody’s a victim 
A: Everybody, everybody’s a victim and everybody’s entitled to truth 
and everybody’s entitled to justice no matter who you are 
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23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
I: Yea 
E: But there’s-You can’t have an hierarchy of victims 
 I: Yea 
 E: you just can’t it’s just impossible because at the end of the day, you 
find a lot of these people, like you take the killings in Ballymurphy,  
I: Yea 
E: it was probably the biggest thing for the IRA. The people probably 
joined because their neighbours and there were getting gunned down and 
murdered  
I: Yep 
E: and they felt powerless. Same in an- in any area, probably the 
Protestant community as well, some of thems took up arms because they felt 
the Catholics were trying to murder their loved ones. And that’s just the way it 
is. And you can’t, you can’t hold their families to ransom because of what they 
done as well 
I: Yep 
E: Because at the end of the day, if an IRA man or a UVF man was 
shot dead doin something wrong, you can’t say to their family, “Oh because 
your son was this or that you can’t, you can’t be a part of this process.” They 
are a part of this process.  
I: Yea 
E: Because we all are. We’re all victims of this. This happened to us.  
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The interviewer’s question at the start of Extract 5 sets up the context because it identifies 
“some Unionist politicians” as being responsible for a definition which would be primarily about 
caring for their own victims. Against this backdrop, both A and E say that “everybody” is a 
victim. Clearly they are not referring to everyone in Northern Ireland but seem to be referring to 
everyone who has been harmed. This leads E to say that “You can’t have an hierarchy of 
victims” (line 13). This is a common expression among people in Northern Ireland and both 
sides object to “an hierarchy of victims” for various reasons. Following this, E advances her 
explanation for why there cannot be an hierarchy in lines 11-31. In line 13, E says that an 
hierarchy is “impossible” because “at the end of the day...” With this latter expression, she aims 
to draw attention to a state of affairs that will exist regardless of which approach is taken. The 
expression aims to avoid controversy by pointing to a common outcome which needs to be 
considered. The outcome is that “you find a lot of these people” may actually have become 
perpetrators as a result of the victimhood. 
E avoids getting bogged down in specific details by using the term “probably” frequently 
in lines 16-28. People “probably” joined the IRA because they felt powerless and Protestants 
“probably” did the same sort of thing. She concludes that summary of events by saying, “And 
that’s just the way it is” (lines 22-23). Those words have the same inescapable sense of reality to 
them as the expression “at the end of the day” which together combine to argue that because a lot 
of people probably did this, then we cannot exclude their families from being victims. 
One effect of the parallels she draws between the Protestant and Catholics in lines 20-24 
is that both sides share to some extent in the responsibility for harming each other. Consequently, 
in line 29 she can argue that even those who have had loved ones injured as a result of being 
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involved in violence, they too “are part of this process”. She can talk about “this” in 31 as the 
mutually harming event which happened to “us”. 
Clearly the inclusivity proposed occurs in an argumentative context – note, for example, 
the quotation of argument-opponents in lines 27-28 who are invoked as a way of positioning the 
speaker against them. But what is the rhetorical function for this inclusivity of victimhood? 
Because the interviewer’s question at the start of the extract was framed in terms of the potential 
exclusion of non-IRA victims, the argument seeks to ensure that this group (the Ballymurphy 
group) is not excluded. In this context the focus is on the similarity of all victims. But in another 
context, the group is happy to argue for an “hierarchy” of sorts even though they disavow the 
name. Towards the end of the focus group G returns to the issue of hierarchy (Extract 6). 
Extract 6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
G: I’m maybe goin back a wee bit on you here, but regarding the 
victims things, when there’s a conflict there’s victims on all sides of it 
I: Yea 
G: But the thing about the truth and why it needs to be it’s the 
innocent victims. It’s the innocent victims who are the real victims like. For 
any man that takes up the gun to fight the British or 
I: mhm 
G: so be it a man who takes up a gun to kill a Catholic or    
something, 
I: Yea 
G: they’re not so much an innocent victim, there’s a thing- There’s 
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innocent victims and there’s victims who choose to do what they choose to 
do. 
I: Right 
G: And all our people were just choosing to look after the next 
person, go and check someone’s all right and all that. So there’s innocent 
victims and there’s not so innocent ones. But they’re possibly still victims if 
you know what I mean – of the conflict 
I: Yea, and the innocent victims have the 
G: Well they should be a hierarchy, if there is, there shouldn’t be a 
hierarchy, but if there should be one, the innocent should be there. 
I: Yea 
G: That’s that one that should be getting sorted out 
I: Yea yea 
G: And that’s why forty, and if it takes another forty years, 
hopefully I’ll still be here 
In this extract he clarifies that there are victims of “all sides of” the conflict (line 2). This 
is a kind of disclaimer because he then issues a “but” (line 4) where he goes on to explain that it 
is “the innocent victims who are the real victims like” (line 5). Thus a distinction is made 
between “real” victims and some other kind of victims who are not as real. However, unlike the 
Unionist groups, there seems to be an unspoken norm which ensures that he cannot dismiss the 
victimhood of others. He can only create different types of victims. So in lines 11-13 he explains 
that there are “innocent victims” and victims who “choose” to engage in violence. These latter 
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type are “possibly still victims” (line 17) but only “of the conflict” (line 18). Thus there are 
“innocent victims” and “victims of the conflict”. 
Again in lines 20-21 we have a disclaimer where he disavows the use of an hierarchy of 
victims, but if there should be one, the innocent should be at the top. This is an unusual kind of 
argument because it relies on a hypothetical future which does not exist nor does he suggest that 
it should exist. Rather, he says that if it should exist. The use of such conditional expressions 
safeguards him from making a hierarchy of victims but still enables him to hypothetically 
construct one. The reason why he argues this is because, as he says in line 23, innocent victims 
are the ones who “should be getting sorted out”. 
This extract points out that even when the terminology of “victim” is used inclusively, it 
does not eliminate difference or the potential for difference to be used as a way of dividing 
victims into different levels or different types. One group of victims can still be singled out as 
needing attention more than other victims – in this case, the innocent victims. In both of these 
examples from the Ballymurphy group we have argued that rhetorical variability is evidenced in 
both the denial and hypothetical affirmation of a hierarchy of victims. The context in each 
situation leads the group to argue differently. 
Rhetorical needs in an ex-prisoners group 
So where does this approach fit with needs-based approaches to victimhood (Shnabel, 
Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009; SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Nadler, 2013) and 
the idea that competitive victimhood is motivated by the desire to fulfil the need for agency or 
moral acceptance? We suggest that issues such as agency and moral acceptance can be 
reconceptualised as rhetorical goals. In other words, if you are having a conversation with a 
victim and start to call into question their group’s agency, you may find them working hard to 
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show that actually their group is powerful. Or you may call into question their morality and they 
might work hard to show that they are in fact a very moral group. Of course, agency and moral 
acceptance may not be exhaustively fulfilled by their conversational attainment (there may still 
be demands for more concrete rhetorical expressions of moral acceptance such as having group 
members installed in a government position) but we argue that they are nevertheless fulfilled to 
some degree.  
When talking with the ex-prisoner’s group the interviewer began talking about how some 
people doubted their morality. Consequently, they said this: 
Extract 7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
B: we’re no less people than anyone else from any other section of 
of our community, and as such deserve to be recognised as such. 
I: yea 
B: uh I think one of the big things for all of us is that the you know 
the equality agenda which runs through everything that we’re all about – 
it’s something that’s still resisted. You still have that, that old guard 
I: yea 
B: of uh you know society here. Certainly within the civil service 
and institutions such as that that would see A and myself and the thirty-five 
or forty thousand prisoners as very much someone who are lesser people. 
Well certainly not.  
I: yea 
B: We’re not accepting that. So that’s what organisations like our 
The rhetorical complexity of victimhood       30 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
own are about. A summed it up really well. I don’t need to 
I: yea 
B: really go over everything again. We, we are active in our 
communities, we live in our communities, we play an active part, we’re 
peacebuilders as A rightly described it. When when other people are runnin 
away from it it’s people like A and many others who are at the interfaces 
I: Yea 
B: of those communities and you know are working hard, you know 
privately, often quietly, tirelessly behind the scenes. So I mean you can’t 
have it both ways. 
In lines 1-2, the logos is stated that they (the ex-prisoners) are no different from anyone 
else in “our community” (the Catholic community). As Billig (1987) has pointed out, logoi imply 
an anti-logoi. Thus the statement they are reacting against is an identity threat which would say, 
“You are different from other people in the Catholic community.” This seems to treat them as 
perpetrators and thus threatens their positive moral identity. 
In 8-10, the interviewee identifies some who might be using this argument. There are 
some within “the civil services and institutions such as that” who see the ex-prisoners as “lesser 
people.” 
In the face of this threat, B needs to build the positive moral identity of the ex-prisoner 
community. He does this in 16-23 where he gives a list of positive activities that the group is 
involved in. This is no “three-part list” (Potter, 1996, p. 196) but the list feature still serves to 
emphasise “the generality of something”. Thus the general impression of this group should be 
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that they are “peacebuilders”. They work “tirelessly behind the scenes”. Thus they cannot be 
both treated as perpetrators and as peacebuilders (22-23). 
In this example, the threat to the group’s positive moral identity has led to a response 
where the group seek to build their positive moral identity before the interviewer. The need for 
positive identity was a rhetorical need. 
When the victim identity is made salient and the power of the victim is threatened, groups 
may tend to respond by arguing for their power and need to be heard. On the other hand, when a 
group’s positive moral identity is threatened, they tend to respond by arguing for their morality 
and usefulness. Thus in the face of a threat to their rhetorical goal of being seen as a moral 
group, this group argued that they were peacebuilders and were actively involved in helping their 
communities. Not only do they feel the need for moral acceptance, but they achieve it through 
what they say. But we differ slightly from the needs-based perspective insofar as victims may not 
necessarily want to represent themselves as having agency because having diminished agency 
may be the ideal strategy for maintaining a sense of superiority over the perpetrator. Thus the 
speaker is very much in control of what they seek in interaction with others. 
Discussion 
In this paper we have pointed out that existing research on victimhood could pay more 
attention to the rhetorical functions of victimhood as seen in discursive interactions. While the 
rhetorical nature of victimhood is acknowledged, it is underexplored at the micro-level of 
analysis. We argue that it is important to see it in these terms because this is where victimhood is 
often expressed. In our analysis, we showed that variability in the expression of forms of 
victimhood (both inclusive and competitive) can be linked to the achievement of rhetorical goals 
in conversations. 
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Competitive or exclusive forms of victimhood were frequently expressed in the Unionist 
group but when concerns were raised over whether the group might be seen as sectarian, 
arguments were quickly adduced to show that (innocent) Catholic and Protestant victims are the 
same. Some form of impression management seems to be at work in such a change in rhetoric 
whereby the group wants to appear positively to others and both competitive and inclusive 
strategies could be used to achieve this. Impression management is a regular feature of everyday 
discourse but its presence here points to the way in which different framings of victimhood can 
provide a positive image and thus fulfil a need/goal associated with victimhood. 
In the Nationalist group slightly different concerns were at stake. In the face of reported 
Unionist threats to their own victimhood, the group strongly asserted that there could not be an 
“hierarchy of victims”. In other words, this was a strongly inclusive strategy that asserted their 
own victimhood as equally valuable to other victims. While some research shows the value of 
inclusive victimhood in elevating the concerns of other victims (Vollhardt, 2009), this shows that 
inclusive forms of victimhood can also be used to elevate the concerns of the ingroup to the same 
level of another group that is recognised as having legitimacy – a pattern seen also by Cohrs et 
al. (2015). However, in the same group, a kind of exclusive form of victimhood does emerge. 
Innocent victims are the “real” victims and they should be receiving attention. While this is a 
different strategy to the inclusive strategy, it shares a common goal – to draw attention to the 
ingroup. And yet, it is not completely exclusive insofar as drawing attention to one’s own group 
need not involve the denial of the other group’s victimhood; victimhood need not be a zero-sum 
game. Victims who are seeking recognition may be less inclusive at times than those who have 
recognition or who are not seeking recognition, but this may not link to negative intentions 
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towards other victim groups. There is thus a complexity to victimhood that reveals multiple 
functions not easily reducible to inclusive/exclusive or competitive/common dichotomies. 
We also argued that issues like agency and morality need not merely be seen in terms of 
psychological drives, but can be conceptualised as rhetorical goals that may be required due to 
conversational demands. While there are doubtless psychological drives behind moral concerns 
we are talking here of the discursive use of morality. In the ex-prisoners group, we highlighted 
how a group commonly categorised as both a victim and perpetrator group, argued for their 
morality in the face of threats to this. While the duality of perpetrator and victim identities has 
been recognised in needs-based research (Simantov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014), it has suggested 
that their empowerment needs are most central and greater antisocial behaviour is exhibited by 
perpetrator-victims. However, in this case, the group argue that they are engaged in extensive 
prosocial work as a way of highlighting and building their positive moral identity. Furthermore, 
we see this as variable at the level of discursive interactions and as opening up new possibilities 
for exploring the role of other needs in victims’ interactions. 
In view of this emphasis on the rhetorical variability of victimhood due to conversational 
demands, there are numerous implications. Firstly, if victimhood is something more intra-
personally variable than has previously been explored, then this has relevance for questionnaire-
design relating to victimhood. The variable nature of victim-talk should warn against divorcing 
victimhood-opinions from the context in which they are expressed. Cohrs et al. (2015) have 
noted that beliefs about victimhood are expressed strategically and that even “inclusive 
victimhood” can be used in strategic ways. For example, Catholic victims often identify with 
Palestinian victims while Protestant victims often identify with Israeli victims. In questionnaire-
design researchers should take care to consider the possible rhetorical context in which questions 
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will be answered. If the participant feels that the questionnaire is being given by an outgroup 
member they may seek to highlight ingroup suffering and deemphasise outgroup suffering. It 
may be worth conducting research to see how the perceived identity of the researcher or their 
institution affects how participants answer a questionnaire relating to victimhood. Asking 
participants for their group-identification and perceptions of the researcher/institution conducting 
the research may provide a means of understanding stated victim-beliefs in that questionnaire 
(e.g. participants may report stronger competitive beliefs if they perceive the institution as 
identifying with the outgroup). 
Furthermore, if needs can be conceptualised in a rhetorical way, there are implications 
here. While we drew on the two needs (power and moral image) suggested by Shnabel & Nadler 
(2008) to show how these might be conceptualised rhetorically, others can be suggested. When 
victims speak they enter into either a real or implied dialogue with those who disagree with 
them. In this dialogue they may have needs such as being acknowledged as factually correct 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2008), rational and not driven blindly by emotion (Edwards, 1999) and 
disinterested by not being driven by personal gain (Edwards & Potter, 2005). These “needs” have 
been recognised by discursive psychologists who consider goals in people’s discourse but have 
not used the term “needs”. Other needs may be present in victims’ discourse and it would be 
interesting to identify these and how they shape victims’ discourses. It would also be interesting 
to examine the effect of granting or denying these needs. How do victims react when people 
accuse them of lying or being driven by emotion or having a vested interest? This could be 
examined by discussing with victims the charges that others bring against them to see how they 
respond. 
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In thinking about the different needs that could be identified and the role of impression 
management in the expression of those needs, it seems that one of the most basic needs is that of 
a positive image. Granted, a positive image will look different depending on the context; some 
victims will want to be seen as lacking agency because they want to be seen as innocent victims 
who need support while others will want to be seen as having agency because they are a force for 
good in promoting reconciliation. The same applies for the suggested needs of being seen as 
truthful or rational or disinterested in personal gain. If this is the case, then it may be that the 
socio-emotional approach to reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) is fundamentally correct in 
asserting the importance of addressing emotional needs but that underlying the emotional needs 
is the issue of positive image. This is why one can imagine a group of victims seeking to display 
low agency but not low morality. Addressing emotional needs then, would be about identifying 
the societal barriers to the positive image of a group and addressing those in creative ways to 
ensure that the fundamental need for positive moral image is met. If self-esteem is conceptually 
related to a positive mental image then addressing this may lead to a reduction in anxiety (as 
proposed by Terror-management theory; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 
2004) and increased willingness to reconcile. This proposal however, is in need of further 
research and validation. 
It would be remiss to conclude without noting some of the limitations of this work. This 
research was conducted entirely within the context of Northern Ireland and thus the “needs” that 
emerge are related to that context. Ex-prisoners’ groups work hard to gain credibility and seek to 
gain funding for their community-work efforts; victims of state violence have not had their 
concerns fully addressed and still seek recognition of the innocence of dead relatives; victims on 
the Unionist side struggle to see some Republican ex-paramilitaries sharing power in Northern 
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Ireland and often oppose such an arrangement. Research conducted in other contexts may yield 
further insight because of the different dynamics of past conflict and current processes to deal 
with the past. Another limitation of this work is that by seeking to explore variability we have 
neglected to explore stability in representations of victimhood and the reasons for this. While 
there is variability in constructions of victimhood, there is not infinite variability because 
collective norms and shared narratives of the past inevitably constrain speakers. Nevertheless, 
our focus on variability has been an attempt to redress what we perceive as an imbalance in 
victimhood-research. 
Thinking then about victimhood in rhetorical terms opens up whole new avenues for 
research. And our purpose should not be misunderstood: we are not trying to dismantle previous 
theories on victimhood and its motivation. Rather, we are trying to show that such research can 
be both added to and fruitfully reinterpreted in light of its rhetorical nature and rather than 
seeking to shut down research, this opens up new possibilities for understanding victimhood. 
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